Analytics pings with query args, cleanup.
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+7
-3
@@ -20,9 +20,12 @@ Struct dumped to disk — separate from the kanta content database, path from
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## What is collected
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The client (`pagerite.js`) POSTs fire-and-forget pings to `/_a` with
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`{fr, to}` (`fr` = source path):
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`fr`, `to`, `hide` and `read` as query parameters (`fr` = source path;
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falsy values are omitted):
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- **Initial page load**: `to` is the loaded path. This ping is what starts
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- **Initial page load**: only `to` — the loaded path — is sent, never `fr`
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(an `fr` equal to `to` would log a bogus self-transition when a session
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already exists, e.g. a second tab). This ping is what starts
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the visit and counts the entry page view — the document GET alone records
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nothing, so bots and admin browsing never register. JS-running crawlers
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(Googlebot, GoogleOther, Applebot, ...) do ping, but their User-Agent
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@@ -34,7 +37,8 @@ The client (`pagerite.js`) POSTs fire-and-forget pings to `/_a` with
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abuse rules regardless. Reloads are not
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visits: the ping is skipped (PerformanceNavigationTiming `reload`), so a
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refresh neither counts a second view nor logs a self-transition. The GET
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handler stashes a cross-origin https `Referer` (origin part only) and any
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handler stashes a cross-origin https `Referer` (origin part only —
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unavailable to JS once the page has loaded) and any
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`utm_*` query parameters in in-memory IP tables, consumed by the ping that
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starts the visit; internal or absent referers never touch the referer table.
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- **Internal fetch-navigations**: `to` is the target path, sent only after
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