paskia/docs/MultiSite.md

# Multi-Site Support

One paskia process on one port serves multiple sites with **one combined
database**. The _administrative instance_ is separated from the _WebAuthn
RP_: organizations and users are global across rp-ids; rp-id is a
first-class per-domain object; passkeys remain tied to their rp-id
(WebAuthn-enforced); sessions remain host-bound. Motivating case:
`app1.company.com` and `app2.com` cannot share an rp-id, but user
management must be under single common controls.

Terminology: a **domain** is one rp-id with its associated hosts and
origins. A **site** is any host served by the instance; each host belongs
to exactly one domain. The _administrative instance_ is the whole process:
global users/orgs, N domains.

## 1. What is global vs. per-domain

**Global (single instance, shared across domains):**

| Data                            | Notes                                                    |
| ------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- |
| Organizations, Roles, Users     | one global collection                                    |
| Permissions                     | `domain` field host-scopes effectiveness                 |
| Sessions                        | host-bound (`Session.host`, exact match)                 |
| Credentials/passkeys            | global collection, each stamped with its `rp_id`         |
| Reset tokens                    | user-bound; global                                       |
| Avatars                         | `paskia.data/users/<uuid>/profile.webp`                  |
| Auth codes, remote-auth manager | in-memory; carry rp-id fields                            |

**Per-domain (registry, keyed by rp-id):**

| Data                             | Notes                                                            |
| -------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `rp_name`, origins, related      | stored combined `Config`                                         |
| `Passkey` instance               | per rp-id; ceremonies verify against the _origin domain's_ rp-id |
| `site_url`/`site_path`           | runtime derivation, per domain                                   |
| OIDC provider (keys, clients)    | per rp-id — each domain is an independent issuer                 |

`db.data()` is a plain global singleton. A contextvar is needed only for
the **current domain** (passkey, config, OIDC view) — not for database
access.

The architectural rule: **authentication establishes identity, not
organization** — the requested hostname selects the org/permission
context after authentication (via `Permission.domain` host-scoping and
session host binding).

## 2. Login architecture: three composable mechanisms

The domain infrastructure is shared by three mechanisms, alternatives
_per deployment_ and composable within one instance.

### 2.A WebAuthn Related Origin Requests (trusted domain families)

WebAuthn Level 3 lets otherwise-unrelated domains share one rp-id: the
canonical RP publishes `/.well-known/webauthn` listing permitted origins,
and those origins may then run ceremonies with the common rp-id locally —
no redirects, no cross-domain cookies. Browser support is universal
(Firefox included).

Model: domain `company.com` with related origin `https://app2.com`. A page
on `app2.com` calls WebAuthn with `rpId: "company.com"`; the passkey is
scoped to `company.com`; `clientDataJSON.origin` is `https://app2.com`,
which the backend validates against the domain's related origins.

Server side: paskia's `Passkey` passes `expected_origin=<the
pre-validated origin>` and `expected_rp_id=self.rp_id`; the webauthn
library string-compares origin and rp-id separately. The frontend never
chooses `rpId` client-side — ceremony options arrive from the server over
the WS. On top of that:

- Origin rule: `origins` and `related` are separate fields.
  An in-domain origin (rp-id or subdomain) is valid unless the domain's
  `origins` allow-list is set, in which case it must be listed there. An
  origin on another domain is valid only when listed in the domain's
  `related` — explicit related listing is the trust boundary.
- `GET /.well-known/webauthn` on the canonical rp-id host serves
  `{"origins": [...]}` from the domain's related origins (404 when there
  are none).
- Dispatch resolution treats a Host matching a configured related-origin
  hostname as belonging to that origin's domain (exact match only —
  `www.app2.com` does not follow `app2.com`).

Deployment constraint: the **browser** fetches
`https://<rp-id>/.well-known/webauthn` from the canonical apex directly —
if paskia does not host the apex, publish the JSON there statically (the
admin domain dialog shows the document for copying).

Constraints (from the WebAuthn WG): implementations must support at least
**5 registrable origin labels** — this is for a small family of
same-trust domains, not hundreds of customer domains. Sharing an rp-id
merges the security boundary: a weakly protected marketing domain should
not share the domain of the admin application. Config validation enforces
a cap (default 5) on related origins per domain.

**Re-enrollment note**: passkeys never move between rp-ids
(WebAuthn-enforced). A host family that first deploys separate domains
(2.B) and later consolidates to Related Origins re-enrolls: authenticate
against the old domain (or via 2.C), register a new credential under the
common rp-id, retire the old one. The per-credential rp-id badge (§9)
makes this visible. There is no automated credential migration.

### 2.B Multiple rp-id domains under one administrative instance

For domains that should _not_ share an rp-id: rp-id is a first-class
object (domain), not an instance attribute. Users are global identities;
credentials carry `rp_id`:

```
Instance
├── Orgs / Roles / Users (global)
└── Domains
    ├── company.com   (origins {...}, credentials scoped by rp_id)
    ├── app2.com      (origins {...}, credentials scoped by rp_id)
    └── customer.net  (origins {...}, credentials scoped by rp_id)
```

Alice can hold both a `company.com` and an `app2.com` passkey; sessions
stay host-only.

### 2.C Remote authorization + opportunistic local enrollment

For a domain where the user has no credential, the remote-login mechanism
provides a federation-style flow: unauthenticated device requests,
authenticated device permits, a short-lived **single-use opaque exchange
code** (60s `CookieCode`) is redeemed by the requesting host, which sets
its own host-only cookie. No shared cookies, no reusable tokens in URLs.

- Cross-domain permits are **allowed**: a device authenticated at
  `company.com` may authorize a session for `app2.com`; the request's
  domain is recorded and shown to the approver; the target host is
  registry-validated.
- **Opportunistic local enrollment**: after a cross-domain remote login,
  the profile view offers "Add a passkey for <domain>" — registration runs
  locally under the new domain's rp-id, stamping `Credential.rp_id`. This
  makes remote login primarily bootstrap/recovery, while everyday
  authentication stays local.

### Policy summary (how deployments choose)

| Situation                                           | Mechanism                                      |
| --------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- |
| Few closely related, equally trusted brand domains  | 2.A Related Origins — one passkey              |
| Independent / customer / lower-trust domains        | 2.B separate domains — passkey per domain      |
| User lacks a credential for the current domain      | 2.C remote authorization, then enroll locally  |

## 3. Configuration model

### 3.1 Stored config

```python
class OriginEntry(msgspec.Struct, omit_defaults=True):
    auth_host: bool = False   # this site hosts the account/admin interface

class DomainConfig(msgspec.Struct, omit_defaults=True):
    rp_name: str | None = None
    origins: dict[str, bool | OriginEntry] = {}  # in-domain sign-in sites
    related: dict[str, bool] = {}                # cross-domain ROR origins (§2.A)

class Config(msgspec.Struct, omit_defaults=True):
    domains: dict[str, DomainConfig]  # keyed by rp-id; at least one
    listen: list[str] | None = None   # process-global
```

- Domains are keyed by rp-id; there is no "default" or "primary" domain.
  Where a domain is needed without request context (bootstrap reset-link
  URL, background jobs), the single configured domain is used, and with
  several domains the first one sorted by rp-id — never for dispatch.
- Origin keys are bare hosts (`app.example.com`), wildcard patterns
  (`*.example.com`), or full origins when not https
  (`http://localhost:8080`) — `https://` is omitted as the common case.
  A dict value of `true` means presence only; an object carries extra
  properties (currently just `auth_host`). Ordering carries no meaning —
  display order is a UI affair.
- An empty `origins` dict means the rp-id and all its subdomains may
  sign in (the default). A non-empty dict is an allow-list of in-domain
  sign-in sites; one entry may be marked `auth_host` (never a wildcard).
- **Origin validation** — two separate concerns: `origins` entries must
  be within the rp-id domain. `related` entries must be outside it, are
  capped (default 5), must not be wildcards, and must not collide with
  another domain's rp-id/auth-host/related origins nor fall inside
  another domain's rp-id. Misfiled entries (cross-domain in `origins`,
  in-domain in `related`) are rejected. These rules are enforced at admin
  write time; at startup the stored config is sanitized best-effort
  instead (§3.2). Origins are never _implicitly_ cross-domain.

### 3.2 CLI: bootstrap (`paskia init`) vs. serve (`paskia`)

The CLI is split so that domain options exist only at bootstrap time —
they can never mix with runtime configuration of an already-configured
instance:

- **`paskia init`** — creates `paskia.kantadb` in CWD and seeds it:
  - `--rp-id`: repeatable/comma-separated, default `["localhost"]`.
    Multiple values create multiple domains at once (useful for
    devserver/e2e).
  - `--rp-name`: applies to the **first** rp-id only. Its purpose is that
    the very first admin registration ceremony already shows the correct
    RP name; everything else (origins, auth hosts, related domains) is
    set up via the admin interface afterwards.
  - `--listen`: stored into `Config.listen` (process-global).
  - Seeds the admin user + registration reset link and prints the link.
    Refuses to run if `paskia.kantadb` already exists, or if an
    unconverted legacy `*.paskiadb` is present (`paskia migrate` converts
    it first).
- **`paskia migrate`** — converts a legacy `<rp-id>.paskiadb` database
  (§10) to `paskia.kantadb`. With several legacy candidates, `--rp-id`
  selects `<rp-id>.paskiadb` by name; the others are left in place.
- **`paskia`** — serve. Takes **no domain options**; only `--listen`
  (per-run override of stored `Config.listen`, never persisted). Startup:
  open `paskia.kantadb` → sanitize the stored domain set best-effort →
  build the domain registry → serve. Sanitization never refuses to start:
  misfiled origin entries are reclassified (a cross-domain `origins`
  entry is served as a related origin) or dropped, colliding
  auth-hosts/related origins resolve first-come-wins, over-cap related
  lists truncate, and unsalvageable domains are skipped — each producing
  a startup warning, because fixing the stored config is the admin
  interface's job and it must stay reachable to do so. Only a config
  with no servable domain at all is fatal. The serve command never
  converts databases: with no `paskia.kantadb`, the startup error points
  at `paskia init`, or at `paskia migrate` when legacy `*.paskiadb`
  candidates are present.

Nested rp-ids are allowed (longest-suffix dispatch determinism). Adding a
child rp-id moves **no data** — users are global; only new ceremonies
stamp the child rp-id.

### 3.3 Runtime accessors

- The domain registry is built in the FastAPI lifespan **after
  `kanta.open()`**, from `db.data().config.domains` — domain data does
  not travel through `PASKIA_CONFIG`. Per-domain `site_url`/`site_path`
  are computed at registry-build time (priority: auth host > exact rp-id
  origin key > first concrete origin key > `PASKIA_VITE_URL` for the
  localhost domain > `http://localhost:port` > `https://rp-id`), using
  the effective listen endpoints for the localhost fallback.
- `PASKIA_CONFIG` carries only process-global serve parameters (the
  effective listen endpoints) so the derivation inside the server
  process can resolve the localhost-port fallback.
- Admin domain writes persist the combined `Config` and rebuild the
  registry in place, so dispatch sees auth host and related-origin
  changes immediately.

## 4. Credentials carry an rp-id

- `Credential.rp_id: str` is stamped at registration from the ceremony's
  rp-id. With Related Origins the stamp is always the _domain's
  canonical_ rp-id regardless of which origin the ceremony ran on — the
  credential genuinely is a `company.com` passkey.
- `authenticate_chat` filters the raw_id scan by `c.rp_id == ceremony
  rp-id` — prevents wrong error semantics and a cross-domain oracle ("no
  credential" vs "verification failed" would leak which rp-id a
  credential belongs to).
- `exclude_credentials` (registration) and reauth `allow_credentials` are
  filtered by the ceremony's rp-id (`User.credential_ids_for(rp_id)`) —
  users are global, so their credential id sets are cross-domain.
- Cascades are uuid-keyed; deleting a user removes their passkeys across
  all domains (correct: users are global).

## 5. Dispatch and domain context

- `paskia/domains.py`: `Domain { config, passkey, ... }` and a registry
  keyed by rp-id, built in the lifespan from the stored combined `Config`
  and rebuilt on admin domain writes. No per-domain Kanta/DB.
- Host resolution (`resolve(host)`): normalize (lowercase, strip port and
  trailing dot), then exact rp-id → exact auth host → **exact
  related-origin hostname** → longest-suffix rp-id. Unknown → `None`.
  (Order safe because startup and admin-write validation forbids
  collisions between these sets.)
- A pure ASGI dispatch middleware, outermost, handles `"http"` and
  `"websocket"` scopes. Unknown Host → 421 Misdirected Request (WS:
  pre-accept close). Sets the `current_domain` contextvar +
  `scope["state"]["domain"]`.
- **WebSocket resolution follows the `Origin`, not the connection
  `Host`**: in auth-host mode the login page is on the app host, the WS
  connects to the auth host, and Origin names the host being logged into.
  So:
  1. the middleware resolves the origin domain from the Origin hostname —
     including related-origin hostnames;
  2. the connection `Host` must be a valid WS endpoint for that domain:
     the domain's _effective auth host_ (§6), or the origin host itself
     when the domain has no auth host at all — else pre-accept reject;
  3. `validate_origin` runs endpoint-side against the origin domain's
     `Passkey` (post-accept JSON errors preserved);
  4. `current_domain` = origin domain for the WS handler's duration.
  The ceremony rp-id is always the origin domain's rp-id — exactly what
  the browser enforces for the page's origin under both classic and
  related-origin rules.

## 6. Auth host: per-domain values with global fallback

A domain's auth host is one of its origins entries marked
`auth_host: true`. A domain without its own auth host falls back to the
first configured auth host found in the registry:

```
effective_auth_host(domain) = domain's own auth host or first configured one or None
```

**Own vs. effective auth host are distinguished everywhere:**

- **Follow the domain's OWN auth host**: UI mode detection (minimal-
  profile decision in `App.vue`, via `own_auth_host` in settings), the
  redirect middleware, `ui_base_path`, and `reset_link_url`. A domain
  with no own auth host keeps its full UI on its own hosts — otherwise
  reset/registration pages on `app2.com` would redirect to
  `auth.company.com`, where the ceremony's Origin resolves the _owner_
  domain and stamps the wrong `Credential.rp_id`, breaking 2.B onboarding
  and 2.C local enrollment.
- **Follow the EFFECTIVE auth host**: WS endpoint selection only
  (`passkey.js` builds the WS URL from settings). The fallback auth host
  serves WS + restricted APIs for foreign domains.
- Settings (`ApiSettings`) exposes both fields (`own_auth_host` alongside
  the effective `auth_host`) so the frontend makes the mode decision
  correctly.
- Root mode (`site_path == "/"`) applies only on a domain's _own_ auth
  host, so it is never ambiguous: a domain's UI lives on its own hosts;
  the fallback auth host serves the _owner_ domain's UI plus WS for the
  rest.

## 7. Login flows and in-memory stores

### 7.1 Auth codes

- `OIDCCode` and `CookieCode` carry `rp_id`, verified at redemption —
  defense in depth.
- **Stamping source matters**: codes are stamped with the domain of the
  session they will redeem — not naively with the current domain at
  issuance. Remote-completion codes are minted inside the _permit_
  handler (permitting domain's context) but redeemed by the _requesting_
  device on its own host, so they are stamped with
  `RemoteAuthRequest.rp_id` — stamping them with the permitter's domain
  would break every cross-domain remote login. Registration-flow and OIDC
  codes stamp from the current domain (issue and redeem sides always
  match). The host re-check at set-session independently binds
  `CookieCode` to the host; the rp_id check complements it.

### 7.2 Remote authentication — cross-domain permits allowed

- `RemoteAuthRequest.rp_id` records the requesting device's origin
  domain.
- **Permit side may differ from the request side** (mechanism 2.C): the
  permitting device authenticates with _its_ domain's passkey, and the
  `session_host=request.host` override creates the session for the
  requesting host. The override must resolve to a **configured domain**
  (registry check) — arbitrary-host session binding is refused. The
  request's rp-id is shown to the permitting user ("device at app2.com
  requests login").
- No policy flag: cross-domain remote login is how the product works
  (users are global).
- Exchange codes stay single-use, 60s, host-bound at redemption.

## 8. OIDC: per-domain providers in one DB

- `DB.oidc` is `dict[str, OIDC]` keyed by rp-id. Each domain is an
  independent provider: own signing key (`oidc.<rp-id>.key` in the
  transaction log shape), own clients.
- The `util/oidjwt.py` key cache is keyed by rp-id.
- Issuer stays per-request-Host — each domain host is an issuer alias
  sharing the domain's key. **`Session` carries two fields**: `issuer`
  (stamped from the WS **Origin**, scheme included, at OIDC-session
  creation and re-stamped at refresh — stamping from the WS _connection_
  Host would be wrong, that is the effective auth host, not the
  authorize/discovery host the RP validates against); and `rp_id` — the
  owning domain, needed by every path that runs **without request
  context**:
  - backchannel logout uses `session.rp_id` to select the domain's key
    and `session.issuer` as `iss`;
  - session listings resolve the client under the session's own domain,
    not the request's.
- Admin OIDC-client CRUD operates on the current domain's `OIDC` entry.
- Permission `domain` validation accepts a subdomain of **any**
  configured rp-id, any related-origin hostname, or any domain's client
  UUID.

## 9. Admin API and UI

- `GET /auth/api/settings`: per-request-Host domain values (rp_id,
  rp_name, effective `auth_host`, `own_auth_host`, site URLs).
- **Domain management (master admin only, `auth:admin`)** — how rp-ids
  are managed after bootstrap:
  - `GET/POST /auth/api/admin/domains/` and
    `PATCH/DELETE /auth/api/admin/domains/{rp_id}`. Writes require recent
    authentication (5 minutes).
  - Create: `rp_id` + optional `rp_name` (defaults to the rp-id),
    `origins` and `related` objects mirroring the stored shape (§3.1);
    full §3.1 validation (cap, cross-domain collisions); registry rebuilt
    immediately, including the domain's `Passkey` instance and OIDC
    provider entry. The auth host is marked inside `origins`
    (`{"auth.example.com": {"auth_host": true}}`).
  - Update: same validation against the would-be combined config.
    Changing a domain's rp-id itself is **not supported** (it would
    orphan every credential stamped with the old rp-id) — delete and
    recreate instead.
  - Delete: refused for the last remaining domain, while any credential
    carries the domain's rp-id (re-enroll or delete those credentials
    first), and for the domain the admin is currently using; cascades
    nothing else (users/orgs are global).
  - **Lockout guard**: an update that would make the admin's current
    host unable to run passkey ceremonies for the domain they are on is
    refused (unless an auth host takes over ceremonies — it is always
    allowed). Fixing a broken stored config is always possible: serve
    sanitizes it best-effort (§3.2) so the admin interface stays
    reachable on a working domain.
  - The admin UI has a Domains section with a table (rp-id + rp-name,
    allowed origins with a 🔑 on the auth host, actions), per-row
    edit/delete and an add-domain dialog. In the dialog the in-domain
    allow-list and the related domains are edited as one list — entries
    are classified by whether they fall within the rp-id domain; related
    domains additionally show the `/.well-known/webauthn` document the
    canonical rp-id must publish and a warning when there are more than
    5. Marking `*.example.com` as the auth host creates a concrete
    `auth.example.com` entry instead.
- Credential listings: `Credential.rp_id` serializes automatically into
  user-info and admin user detail responses; the frontend shows an rp-id
  badge **only when `credential.rp_id !== settings.rp_id`** — single-
  domain installs never show a badge.
- **Enrollment prompt (2.C)**: when the user has no passkey for the
  current domain, the profile view offers to add one (a fresh remote-auth
  session satisfies the recent-auth requirement of registration).
- **Bootstrap check**: the "admin has no credentials" startup check
  passes if the admin holds a credential under **any** configured domain;
  otherwise a registration link is printed for the first domain (sorted
  by rp-id).

## 10. Storage

- Fixed CWD-relative path: **`paskia.kantadb`** — a single kanta JSONL
  file. Kanta rotation siblings (`paskia@<timestamp>.kantadb`) are
  unaffected. There is no environment override; CWD selects the
  deployment.
- **User files** (avatars) live in the fixed sibling directory
  **`paskia.data/users/`**.
- **Legacy conversion**: `paskia migrate` converts a legacy
  `*.paskiadb` database — a directory containing `main.db`, or a legacy
  single-file database — into `paskia.kantadb`: `main.db` (or the single
  file) becomes `paskia.kantadb`, `users/` becomes `paskia.data/users/`,
  and the old directory is renamed aside to `<name>.converted-bak`. A
  lone candidate converts without options; with several candidates
  `--rp-id <rp-id>` selects `<rp-id>.paskiadb` by name and the rest are
  left in place (e.g. a `*.bak.paskiadb` backup does not block
  conversion). Empty directories are ignored. Conversion is an explicit
  operator action, never a serve side effect — read-only opens never
  trigger conversion or writes.
- The legacy database's structs live in a separate module
  (`paskia/db/legacy.py`). There is no multi-database merging.
- The startup box prints per-domain lines.

## 11. Lifespan and background tasks

- One `Kanta` for `paskia.kantadb`, opened once in the lifespan; one
  background cleanup task (DB is global).
- The kanta bootstrap hook only ever fires for a database created by
  `paskia init` or `paskia migrate`; the serve command never bootstraps.
- The registry is built from the stored `Config` after open, sanitized
  best-effort (§3.2) so startup never fails on config content; per-domain
  `Passkey` instances are constructed from the sanitized config.
- The admin-credential check runs at serve startup and reprints a usable
  registration link when the admin lacks a credential under any
  configured domain (§9).
- `oidc_notify` fire-and-forget tasks need no domain context for DB
  access (global DB); issuer comes from the session (§8).
- The dispatch middleware is the only place `current_domain` is set for
  requests; admin domain writes rebuild the registry.

## 12. Development

- `scripts/devserver.py`: bootstraps via one-shot `paskia init` when no
  database exists (multi `--rp-id`, `--rp-name` for the first domain),
  then runs plain `paskia` serve. Caddy dev origins iterate all bootstrap
  rp-ids.
- `PASKIA_AUTH_HOST` (consumed by `frontend/vite.config.js`) is a
  comma-separated list of bare hostnames; the vite dev proxy forwards
  `/.well-known/openid-configuration` and `/.well-known/webauthn` to the
  backend.
- The example `caddy/auth/setup` snippet forwards both well-known paths
  to paskia so a static `/.well-known/*` handler does not shadow them.
- E2E: `e2e/tests/global-setup.ts` runs `paskia init --rp-id
  localhost,test.localhost` in the test-data dir (which doubles as the
  server CWD) and serves; `e2e/tests/50-multidomain.spec.ts` exercises
  host dispatch, the well-known endpoint via the admin domain API, and a
  cross-domain remote login (request at test.localhost, permit at
  localhost, session valid on test.localhost) including the enrollment
  prompt UI. Related Origins have **no browser e2e**: a genuine related
  origin needs a non-subdomain host over HTTPS, and the browser fetches
  the well-known document itself — server-side coverage is in pytest
  (`tests/test_domains.py`).

## 13. Security model

- **Dispatch**: unknown Host → 421 before any router/DB access (direct-IP
  and unconfigured-name access does not work; trailing dots normalized).
- **Related Origins boundary**: cross-domain origins are valid only when
  explicitly configured and capped; the well-known document is served
  only for the canonical domain and only lists configured origins. All
  origins sharing an rp-id share one security boundary — do not mix trust
  levels within a domain.
- **Domain administration**: domain create/update/delete is gated on
  `auth:admin` — deployment-wide by design. Writes are strictly
  validated (cross-domain rules plus self-lockout guards); startup never
  refuses a stored config — it sanitizes with warnings so the admin
  interface stays reachable to fix problems.
- **Passkeys**: rp-id binding browser-enforced and server-recorded;
  ceremonies, credential scans, exclude/allow lists all scoped to the
  origin domain's rp-id. No cross-domain oracle in the scan.
- **Sessions**: host-bound, exact match. Cross-domain sessions arise only
  via (a) a ceremony at the origin domain (incl. related origins), or (b)
  a remote permit by a device holding a valid session at its own domain,
  with registry-validated target host.
- **Users/orgs global**: deleting a user/org cascades across all domains —
  intended. `auth:admin` is deployment-wide. Permission `domain`
  host-scopes effectiveness per host.
- **Cross-domain permit transparency**: requesting domain/host shown to
  the approver; both sides logged.
- **Secret hygiene in logs**: the OIDC signing-key censoring matches the
  `oidc.<rp-id>.key` path shape, so domain keys never print in plaintext
  in the JSONL transaction log.
- **OIDC**: per-domain keys/issuers; logout tokens carry the stored
  issuer.