LeoVasanko
f2e6f5784e
Finish the realm→domain terminology removal across source, tests, e2e and docs. The stored config drops all lists: Config.domains is keyed by rp-id, DomainConfig.origins/related are objects keyed by host (https:// omitted), values True or OriginEntry(auth_host=True). The default/primary domain concept is gone; ordering is display-time. Tests and e2e updated to the new API shapes (not run). Database re-migrated from the legacy backup into the new format.
521 lines
27 KiB
Markdown
521 lines
27 KiB
Markdown
# Multi-Site Support
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One paskia process on one port serves multiple sites with **one combined
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database**. The _administrative instance_ is separated from the _WebAuthn
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RP_: organizations and users are global across rp-ids; rp-id is a
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first-class per-domain object; passkeys remain tied to their rp-id
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(WebAuthn-enforced); sessions remain host-bound. Motivating case:
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`app1.company.com` and `app2.com` cannot share an rp-id, but user
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management must be under single common controls.
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Terminology: a **domain** is one rp-id with its associated hosts and
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origins. A **site** is any host served by the instance; each host belongs
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to exactly one domain. The _administrative instance_ is the whole process:
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global users/orgs, N domains.
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## 1. What is global vs. per-domain
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**Global (single instance, shared across domains):**
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| Data | Notes |
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| ------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Organizations, Roles, Users | one global collection |
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| Permissions | `domain` field host-scopes effectiveness |
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| Sessions | host-bound (`Session.host`, exact match) |
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| Credentials/passkeys | global collection, each stamped with its `rp_id` |
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| Reset tokens | user-bound; global |
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| Avatars | `paskia.data/users/<uuid>/profile.webp` |
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| Auth codes, remote-auth manager | in-memory; carry rp-id fields |
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**Per-domain (registry, keyed by rp-id):**
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| Data | Notes |
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| -------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `rp_name`, origins, related | stored combined `Config` |
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| `Passkey` instance | per rp-id; ceremonies verify against the _origin domain's_ rp-id |
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| `site_url`/`site_path` | runtime derivation, per domain |
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| OIDC provider (keys, clients) | per rp-id — each domain is an independent issuer |
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`db.data()` is a plain global singleton. A contextvar is needed only for
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the **current domain** (passkey, config, OIDC view) — not for database
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access.
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The architectural rule: **authentication establishes identity, not
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organization** — the requested hostname selects the org/permission
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context after authentication (via `Permission.domain` host-scoping and
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session host binding).
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## 2. Login architecture: three composable mechanisms
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The domain infrastructure is shared by three mechanisms, alternatives
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_per deployment_ and composable within one instance.
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### 2.A WebAuthn Related Origin Requests (trusted domain families)
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WebAuthn Level 3 lets otherwise-unrelated domains share one rp-id: the
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canonical RP publishes `/.well-known/webauthn` listing permitted origins,
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and those origins may then run ceremonies with the common rp-id locally —
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no redirects, no cross-domain cookies. Browser support is universal
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(Firefox included).
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Model: domain `company.com` with related origin `https://app2.com`. A page
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on `app2.com` calls WebAuthn with `rpId: "company.com"`; the passkey is
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scoped to `company.com`; `clientDataJSON.origin` is `https://app2.com`,
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which the backend validates against the domain's related origins.
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Server side: paskia's `Passkey` passes `expected_origin=<the
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pre-validated origin>` and `expected_rp_id=self.rp_id`; the webauthn
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library string-compares origin and rp-id separately. The frontend never
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chooses `rpId` client-side — ceremony options arrive from the server over
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the WS. On top of that:
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- Origin rule: `origins` and `related` are separate fields.
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An in-domain origin (rp-id or subdomain) is valid unless the domain's
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`origins` allow-list is set, in which case it must be listed there. An
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origin on another domain is valid only when listed in the domain's
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`related` — explicit related listing is the trust boundary.
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- `GET /.well-known/webauthn` on the canonical rp-id host serves
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`{"origins": [...]}` from the domain's related origins (404 when there
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are none).
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- Dispatch resolution treats a Host matching a configured related-origin
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hostname as belonging to that origin's domain (exact match only —
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`www.app2.com` does not follow `app2.com`).
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Deployment constraint: the **browser** fetches
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`https://<rp-id>/.well-known/webauthn` from the canonical apex directly —
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if paskia does not host the apex, publish the JSON there statically (the
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admin domain dialog shows the document for copying).
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Constraints (from the WebAuthn WG): implementations must support at least
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**5 registrable origin labels** — this is for a small family of
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same-trust domains, not hundreds of customer domains. Sharing an rp-id
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merges the security boundary: a weakly protected marketing domain should
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not share the domain of the admin application. Config validation enforces
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a cap (default 5) on related origins per domain.
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**Re-enrollment note**: passkeys never move between rp-ids
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(WebAuthn-enforced). A host family that first deploys separate domains
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(2.B) and later consolidates to Related Origins re-enrolls: authenticate
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against the old domain (or via 2.C), register a new credential under the
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common rp-id, retire the old one. The per-credential rp-id badge (§9)
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makes this visible. There is no automated credential migration.
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### 2.B Multiple rp-id domains under one administrative instance
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For domains that should _not_ share an rp-id: rp-id is a first-class
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object (domain), not an instance attribute. Users are global identities;
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credentials carry `rp_id`:
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```
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Instance
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├── Orgs / Roles / Users (global)
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└── Domains
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├── company.com (origins {...}, credentials scoped by rp_id)
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├── app2.com (origins {...}, credentials scoped by rp_id)
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└── customer.net (origins {...}, credentials scoped by rp_id)
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```
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Alice can hold both a `company.com` and an `app2.com` passkey; sessions
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stay host-only.
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### 2.C Remote authorization + opportunistic local enrollment
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For a domain where the user has no credential, the remote-login mechanism
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provides a federation-style flow: unauthenticated device requests,
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authenticated device permits, a short-lived **single-use opaque exchange
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code** (60s `CookieCode`) is redeemed by the requesting host, which sets
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its own host-only cookie. No shared cookies, no reusable tokens in URLs.
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- Cross-domain permits are **allowed**: a device authenticated at
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`company.com` may authorize a session for `app2.com`; the request's
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domain is recorded and shown to the approver; the target host is
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registry-validated.
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- **Opportunistic local enrollment**: after a cross-domain remote login,
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the profile view offers "Add a passkey for <domain>" — registration runs
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locally under the new domain's rp-id, stamping `Credential.rp_id`. This
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makes remote login primarily bootstrap/recovery, while everyday
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authentication stays local.
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### Policy summary (how deployments choose)
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| Situation | Mechanism |
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| --------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- |
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| Few closely related, equally trusted brand domains | 2.A Related Origins — one passkey |
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| Independent / customer / lower-trust domains | 2.B separate domains — passkey per domain |
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| User lacks a credential for the current domain | 2.C remote authorization, then enroll locally |
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## 3. Configuration model
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### 3.1 Stored config
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```python
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class OriginEntry(msgspec.Struct, omit_defaults=True):
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auth_host: bool = False # this site hosts the account/admin interface
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class DomainConfig(msgspec.Struct, omit_defaults=True):
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rp_name: str | None = None
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origins: dict[str, bool | OriginEntry] = {} # in-domain sign-in sites
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related: dict[str, bool] = {} # cross-domain ROR origins (§2.A)
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class Config(msgspec.Struct, omit_defaults=True):
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domains: dict[str, DomainConfig] # keyed by rp-id; at least one
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listen: list[str] | None = None # process-global
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```
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- Domains are keyed by rp-id; there is no "default" or "primary" domain.
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Where a domain is needed without request context (bootstrap reset-link
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URL, background jobs), the single configured domain is used, and with
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several domains the first one sorted by rp-id — never for dispatch.
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- Origin keys are bare hosts (`app.example.com`), wildcard patterns
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(`*.example.com`), or full origins when not https
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(`http://localhost:8080`) — `https://` is omitted as the common case.
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A dict value of `true` means presence only; an object carries extra
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properties (currently just `auth_host`). Ordering carries no meaning —
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display order is a UI affair.
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- An empty `origins` dict means the rp-id and all its subdomains may
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sign in (the default). A non-empty dict is an allow-list of in-domain
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sign-in sites; one entry may be marked `auth_host` (never a wildcard).
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- **Origin validation** — two separate concerns: `origins` entries must
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be within the rp-id domain. `related` entries must be outside it, are
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capped (default 5), must not be wildcards, and must not collide with
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another domain's rp-id/auth-host/related origins nor fall inside
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another domain's rp-id. Misfiled entries (cross-domain in `origins`,
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in-domain in `related`) are rejected. These rules are enforced at admin
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write time; at startup the stored config is sanitized best-effort
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instead (§3.2). Origins are never _implicitly_ cross-domain.
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### 3.2 CLI: bootstrap (`paskia init`) vs. serve (`paskia`)
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The CLI is split so that domain options exist only at bootstrap time —
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they can never mix with runtime configuration of an already-configured
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instance:
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- **`paskia init`** — creates `paskia.kantadb` in CWD and seeds it:
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- `--rp-id`: repeatable/comma-separated, default `["localhost"]`.
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Multiple values create multiple domains at once (useful for
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devserver/e2e).
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- `--rp-name`, `--auth-host`, `--origin`: apply to the **first**
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rp-id only. Their purpose is that the very first admin registration
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ceremony already shows the correct RP name; everything is editable
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via the admin interface afterwards.
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- `--listen`: stored into `Config.listen` (process-global).
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- Seeds the admin user + registration reset link and prints the link.
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Refuses to run if `paskia.kantadb` already exists, or if an
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unconverted legacy `*.paskiadb` is present (`paskia migrate` converts
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it first).
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- **`paskia migrate`** — converts a legacy `<rp-id>.paskiadb` database
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(§10) to `paskia.kantadb`. With several legacy candidates, `--rp-id`
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selects `<rp-id>.paskiadb` by name; the others are left in place.
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- **`paskia`** — serve. Takes **no domain options**; only `--listen`
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(per-run override of stored `Config.listen`, never persisted). Startup:
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open `paskia.kantadb` → sanitize the stored domain set best-effort →
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build the domain registry → serve. Sanitization never refuses to start:
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misfiled origin entries are reclassified (a cross-domain `origins`
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entry is served as a related origin) or dropped, colliding
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auth-hosts/related origins resolve first-come-wins, over-cap related
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lists truncate, and unsalvageable domains are skipped — each producing
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a startup warning, because fixing the stored config is the admin
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interface's job and it must stay reachable to do so. Only a config
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with no servable domain at all is fatal. The serve command never
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converts databases: with no `paskia.kantadb`, the startup error points
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at `paskia init`, or at `paskia migrate` when legacy `*.paskiadb`
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candidates are present.
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Nested rp-ids are allowed (longest-suffix dispatch determinism). Adding a
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child rp-id moves **no data** — users are global; only new ceremonies
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stamp the child rp-id.
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### 3.3 Runtime accessors
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- The domain registry is built in the FastAPI lifespan **after
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`kanta.open()`**, from `db.data().config.domains` — domain data does
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not travel through `PASKIA_CONFIG`. Per-domain `site_url`/`site_path`
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are computed at registry-build time (priority: auth host > exact rp-id
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origin key > first concrete origin key > `PASKIA_VITE_URL` for the
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localhost domain > `http://localhost:port` > `https://rp-id`), using
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the effective listen endpoints for the localhost fallback.
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- `PASKIA_CONFIG` carries only process-global serve parameters (the
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effective listen endpoints) so the derivation inside the server
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process can resolve the localhost-port fallback.
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- Admin domain writes persist the combined `Config` and rebuild the
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registry in place, so dispatch sees auth host and related-origin
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changes immediately.
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## 4. Credentials carry an rp-id
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- `Credential.rp_id: str` is stamped at registration from the ceremony's
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rp-id. With Related Origins the stamp is always the _domain's
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canonical_ rp-id regardless of which origin the ceremony ran on — the
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credential genuinely is a `company.com` passkey.
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- `authenticate_chat` filters the raw_id scan by `c.rp_id == ceremony
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rp-id` — prevents wrong error semantics and a cross-domain oracle ("no
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credential" vs "verification failed" would leak which rp-id a
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credential belongs to).
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- `exclude_credentials` (registration) and reauth `allow_credentials` are
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filtered by the ceremony's rp-id (`User.credential_ids_for(rp_id)`) —
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users are global, so their credential id sets are cross-domain.
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- Cascades are uuid-keyed; deleting a user removes their passkeys across
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all domains (correct: users are global).
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## 5. Dispatch and domain context
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- `paskia/domains.py`: `Domain { config, passkey, ... }` and a registry
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keyed by rp-id, built in the lifespan from the stored combined `Config`
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and rebuilt on admin domain writes. No per-domain Kanta/DB.
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- Host resolution (`resolve(host)`): normalize (lowercase, strip port and
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trailing dot), then exact rp-id → exact auth host → **exact
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related-origin hostname** → longest-suffix rp-id. Unknown → `None`.
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(Order safe because startup and admin-write validation forbids
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collisions between these sets.)
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- A pure ASGI dispatch middleware, outermost, handles `"http"` and
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`"websocket"` scopes. Unknown Host → 421 Misdirected Request (WS:
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pre-accept close). Sets the `current_domain` contextvar +
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`scope["state"]["domain"]`.
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- **WebSocket resolution follows the `Origin`, not the connection
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`Host`**: in auth-host mode the login page is on the app host, the WS
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connects to the auth host, and Origin names the host being logged into.
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So:
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1. the middleware resolves the origin domain from the Origin hostname —
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including related-origin hostnames;
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2. the connection `Host` must be a valid WS endpoint for that domain:
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the domain's _effective auth host_ (§6), or the origin host itself
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when the domain has no auth host at all — else pre-accept reject;
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3. `validate_origin` runs endpoint-side against the origin domain's
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`Passkey` (post-accept JSON errors preserved);
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4. `current_domain` = origin domain for the WS handler's duration.
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The ceremony rp-id is always the origin domain's rp-id — exactly what
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the browser enforces for the page's origin under both classic and
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related-origin rules.
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## 6. Auth host: per-domain values with global fallback
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A domain's auth host is one of its origins entries marked
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`auth_host: true`. A domain without its own auth host falls back to the
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first configured auth host found in the registry:
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```
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effective_auth_host(domain) = domain's own auth host or first configured one or None
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```
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**Own vs. effective auth host are distinguished everywhere:**
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- **Follow the domain's OWN auth host**: UI mode detection (minimal-
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profile decision in `App.vue`, via `own_auth_host` in settings), the
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redirect middleware, `ui_base_path`, and `reset_link_url`. A domain
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with no own auth host keeps its full UI on its own hosts — otherwise
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reset/registration pages on `app2.com` would redirect to
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`auth.company.com`, where the ceremony's Origin resolves the _owner_
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domain and stamps the wrong `Credential.rp_id`, breaking 2.B onboarding
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and 2.C local enrollment.
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- **Follow the EFFECTIVE auth host**: WS endpoint selection only
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(`passkey.js` builds the WS URL from settings). The fallback auth host
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serves WS + restricted APIs for foreign domains.
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- Settings (`ApiSettings`) exposes both fields (`own_auth_host` alongside
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the effective `auth_host`) so the frontend makes the mode decision
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correctly.
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- Root mode (`site_path == "/"`) applies only on a domain's _own_ auth
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host, so it is never ambiguous: a domain's UI lives on its own hosts;
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the fallback auth host serves the _owner_ domain's UI plus WS for the
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rest.
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## 7. Login flows and in-memory stores
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### 7.1 Auth codes
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- `OIDCCode` and `CookieCode` carry `rp_id`, verified at redemption —
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defense in depth.
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- **Stamping source matters**: codes are stamped with the domain of the
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session they will redeem — not naively with the current domain at
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issuance. Remote-completion codes are minted inside the _permit_
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handler (permitting domain's context) but redeemed by the _requesting_
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device on its own host, so they are stamped with
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`RemoteAuthRequest.rp_id` — stamping them with the permitter's domain
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would break every cross-domain remote login. Registration-flow and OIDC
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codes stamp from the current domain (issue and redeem sides always
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match). The host re-check at set-session independently binds
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`CookieCode` to the host; the rp_id check complements it.
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### 7.2 Remote authentication — cross-domain permits allowed
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- `RemoteAuthRequest.rp_id` records the requesting device's origin
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domain.
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- **Permit side may differ from the request side** (mechanism 2.C): the
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permitting device authenticates with _its_ domain's passkey, and the
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`session_host=request.host` override creates the session for the
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requesting host. The override must resolve to a **configured domain**
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(registry check) — arbitrary-host session binding is refused. The
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request's rp-id is shown to the permitting user ("device at app2.com
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requests login").
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- No policy flag: cross-domain remote login is how the product works
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(users are global).
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- Exchange codes stay single-use, 60s, host-bound at redemption.
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## 8. OIDC: per-domain providers in one DB
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- `DB.oidc` is `dict[str, OIDC]` keyed by rp-id. Each domain is an
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independent provider: own signing key (`oidc.<rp-id>.key` in the
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transaction log shape), own clients.
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- The `util/oidjwt.py` key cache is keyed by rp-id.
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- Issuer stays per-request-Host — each domain host is an issuer alias
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sharing the domain's key. **`Session` carries two fields**: `issuer`
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(stamped from the WS **Origin**, scheme included, at OIDC-session
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creation and re-stamped at refresh — stamping from the WS _connection_
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Host would be wrong, that is the effective auth host, not the
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authorize/discovery host the RP validates against); and `rp_id` — the
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owning domain, needed by every path that runs **without request
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context**:
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- backchannel logout uses `session.rp_id` to select the domain's key
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and `session.issuer` as `iss`;
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- session listings resolve the client under the session's own domain,
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not the request's.
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- Admin OIDC-client CRUD operates on the current domain's `OIDC` entry.
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- Permission `domain` validation accepts a subdomain of **any**
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configured rp-id, any related-origin hostname, or any domain's client
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UUID.
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## 9. Admin API and UI
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- `GET /auth/api/settings`: per-request-Host domain values (rp_id,
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rp_name, effective `auth_host`, `own_auth_host`, site URLs).
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- **Domain management (master admin only, `auth:admin`)** — how rp-ids
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are managed after bootstrap:
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- `GET/POST /auth/api/admin/domains/` and
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`PATCH/DELETE /auth/api/admin/domains/{rp_id}`. Writes require recent
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authentication (5 minutes).
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- Create: `rp_id` + optional `rp_name` (defaults to the rp-id),
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`origins` and `related` objects mirroring the stored shape (§3.1);
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full §3.1 validation (cap, cross-domain collisions); registry rebuilt
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immediately, including the domain's `Passkey` instance and OIDC
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provider entry. The auth host is marked inside `origins`
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(`{"auth.example.com": {"auth_host": true}}`).
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- Update: same validation against the would-be combined config.
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Changing a domain's rp-id itself is **not supported** (it would
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orphan every credential stamped with the old rp-id) — delete and
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recreate instead.
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- Delete: refused for the last remaining domain, while any credential
|
|
carries the domain's rp-id (re-enroll or delete those credentials
|
|
first), and for the domain the admin is currently using; cascades
|
|
nothing else (users/orgs are global).
|
|
- **Lockout guard**: an update that would make the admin's current
|
|
host unable to run passkey ceremonies for the domain they are on is
|
|
refused (unless an auth host takes over ceremonies — it is always
|
|
allowed). Fixing a broken stored config is always possible: serve
|
|
sanitizes it best-effort (§3.2) so the admin interface stays
|
|
reachable on a working domain.
|
|
- The admin UI has a Domains section with a table (rp-id + rp-name,
|
|
allowed origins with a 🔑 on the auth host, actions), per-row
|
|
edit/delete and an add-domain dialog. In the dialog the in-domain
|
|
allow-list and the related domains are edited as one list — entries
|
|
are classified by whether they fall within the rp-id domain; related
|
|
domains additionally show the `/.well-known/webauthn` document the
|
|
canonical rp-id must publish and a warning when there are more than
|
|
5. Marking `*.example.com` as the auth host creates a concrete
|
|
`auth.example.com` entry instead.
|
|
- Credential listings: `Credential.rp_id` serializes automatically into
|
|
user-info and admin user detail responses; the frontend shows an rp-id
|
|
badge **only when `credential.rp_id !== settings.rp_id`** — single-
|
|
domain installs never show a badge.
|
|
- **Enrollment prompt (2.C)**: when the user has no passkey for the
|
|
current domain, the profile view offers to add one (a fresh remote-auth
|
|
session satisfies the recent-auth requirement of registration).
|
|
- **Bootstrap check**: the "admin has no credentials" startup check
|
|
passes if the admin holds a credential under **any** configured domain;
|
|
otherwise a registration link is printed for the first domain (sorted
|
|
by rp-id).
|
|
|
|
## 10. Storage
|
|
|
|
- Fixed CWD-relative path: **`paskia.kantadb`** — a single kanta JSONL
|
|
file. Kanta rotation siblings (`paskia@<timestamp>.kantadb`) are
|
|
unaffected. There is no environment override; CWD selects the
|
|
deployment.
|
|
- **User files** (avatars) live in the fixed sibling directory
|
|
**`paskia.data/users/`**.
|
|
- **Legacy conversion**: `paskia migrate` converts a legacy
|
|
`*.paskiadb` database — a directory containing `main.db`, or a legacy
|
|
single-file database — into `paskia.kantadb`: `main.db` (or the single
|
|
file) becomes `paskia.kantadb`, `users/` becomes `paskia.data/users/`,
|
|
and the old directory is renamed aside to `<name>.converted-bak`. A
|
|
lone candidate converts without options; with several candidates
|
|
`--rp-id <rp-id>` selects `<rp-id>.paskiadb` by name and the rest are
|
|
left in place (e.g. a `*.bak.paskiadb` backup does not block
|
|
conversion). Empty directories are ignored. Conversion is an explicit
|
|
operator action, never a serve side effect — read-only opens never
|
|
trigger conversion or writes.
|
|
- The legacy database's structs live in a separate module
|
|
(`paskia/db/legacy.py`). There is no multi-database merging.
|
|
- The startup box prints per-domain lines.
|
|
|
|
## 11. Lifespan and background tasks
|
|
|
|
- One `Kanta` for `paskia.kantadb`, opened once in the lifespan; one
|
|
background cleanup task (DB is global).
|
|
- The kanta bootstrap hook only ever fires for a database created by
|
|
`paskia init` or `paskia migrate`; the serve command never bootstraps.
|
|
- The registry is built from the stored `Config` after open, sanitized
|
|
best-effort (§3.2) so startup never fails on config content; per-domain
|
|
`Passkey` instances are constructed from the sanitized config.
|
|
- The admin-credential check runs at serve startup and reprints a usable
|
|
registration link when the admin lacks a credential under any
|
|
configured domain (§9).
|
|
- `oidc_notify` fire-and-forget tasks need no domain context for DB
|
|
access (global DB); issuer comes from the session (§8).
|
|
- The dispatch middleware is the only place `current_domain` is set for
|
|
requests; admin domain writes rebuild the registry.
|
|
|
|
## 12. Development
|
|
|
|
- `scripts/devserver.py`: bootstraps via one-shot `paskia init` when no
|
|
database exists (multi `--rp-id`, and `--rp-name`/`--auth-host`/
|
|
`--origin` for the first domain), then runs plain `paskia` serve.
|
|
Caddy dev origins iterate all bootstrap rp-ids plus the auth host and
|
|
explicit origins.
|
|
- `PASKIA_AUTH_HOST` (consumed by `frontend/vite.config.js`) is a
|
|
comma-separated list of bare hostnames; the vite dev proxy forwards
|
|
`/.well-known/openid-configuration` and `/.well-known/webauthn` to the
|
|
backend.
|
|
- The example `caddy/auth/setup` snippet forwards both well-known paths
|
|
to paskia so a static `/.well-known/*` handler does not shadow them.
|
|
- E2E: `e2e/tests/global-setup.ts` runs `paskia init --rp-id
|
|
localhost,test.localhost` in the test-data dir (which doubles as the
|
|
server CWD) and serves; `e2e/tests/50-multidomain.spec.ts` exercises
|
|
host dispatch, the well-known endpoint via the admin domain API, and a
|
|
cross-domain remote login (request at test.localhost, permit at
|
|
localhost, session valid on test.localhost) including the enrollment
|
|
prompt UI. Related Origins have **no browser e2e**: a genuine related
|
|
origin needs a non-subdomain host over HTTPS, and the browser fetches
|
|
the well-known document itself — server-side coverage is in pytest
|
|
(`tests/test_domains.py`).
|
|
|
|
## 13. Security model
|
|
|
|
- **Dispatch**: unknown Host → 421 before any router/DB access (direct-IP
|
|
and unconfigured-name access does not work; trailing dots normalized).
|
|
- **Related Origins boundary**: cross-domain origins are valid only when
|
|
explicitly configured and capped; the well-known document is served
|
|
only for the canonical domain and only lists configured origins. All
|
|
origins sharing an rp-id share one security boundary — do not mix trust
|
|
levels within a domain.
|
|
- **Domain administration**: domain create/update/delete is gated on
|
|
`auth:admin` — deployment-wide by design. Writes are strictly
|
|
validated (cross-domain rules plus self-lockout guards); startup never
|
|
refuses a stored config — it sanitizes with warnings so the admin
|
|
interface stays reachable to fix problems.
|
|
- **Passkeys**: rp-id binding browser-enforced and server-recorded;
|
|
ceremonies, credential scans, exclude/allow lists all scoped to the
|
|
origin domain's rp-id. No cross-domain oracle in the scan.
|
|
- **Sessions**: host-bound, exact match. Cross-domain sessions arise only
|
|
via (a) a ceremony at the origin domain (incl. related origins), or (b)
|
|
a remote permit by a device holding a valid session at its own domain,
|
|
with registry-validated target host.
|
|
- **Users/orgs global**: deleting a user/org cascades across all domains —
|
|
intended. `auth:admin` is deployment-wide. Permission `domain`
|
|
host-scopes effectiveness per host.
|
|
- **Cross-domain permit transparency**: requesting domain/host shown to
|
|
the approver; both sides logged.
|
|
- **Secret hygiene in logs**: the OIDC signing-key censoring matches the
|
|
`oidc.<rp-id>.key` path shape, so domain keys never print in plaintext
|
|
in the JSONL transaction log.
|
|
- **OIDC**: per-domain keys/issuers; logout tokens carry the stored
|
|
issuer.
|