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2 Commits
2 changed files with 14 additions and 2 deletions
+3 -1
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@@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ async def watch(req, ws):
if sso.paskia_enabled():
# SSO auth: call validation to get user info (don't enforce auth in public mode)
try:
await sso.validate_sso_request(req)
# WebSocket cannot forward Set-Cookie, so ask the auth backend not to
# renew the session here; renewal happens on the HTTP side instead.
await sso.validate_sso_request(req, renew=False)
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("watch SSO validation failed: %s", e)
if sso_user := getattr(req.ctx, "sso_user", None):
+11 -1
View File
@@ -62,12 +62,18 @@ async def close_client():
_client = None
async def validate_sso_request(request, *, perm: str = "cista:login") -> dict | None:
async def validate_sso_request(
request, *, perm: str = "cista:login", renew: bool = True
) -> dict | None:
"""Validate an SSO request against the auth backend.
Args:
request: The Sanic request object
perm: Permission to validate (default: cista:login, privileged also cista:admin)
renew: Whether to allow the auth backend to renew the session cookie.
Use ``False`` for WebSocket validation where Set-Cookie cannot be
forwarded to the client; this makes the request read-only and avoids
resetting the backend renewal timeout.
Returns:
User info dict if valid, None if validation fails with auth required response
@@ -88,12 +94,16 @@ async def validate_sso_request(request, *, perm: str = "cista:login") -> dict |
headers["cookie"] = request.headers["cookie"]
if "authorization" in request.headers:
headers["authorization"] = request.headers["authorization"]
if "user-agent" in request.headers:
headers["user-agent"] = request.headers["user-agent"]
headers["accept"] = "application/json"
headers["x-forwarded-for"] = request.client_ip
headers["x-forwarded-host"] = request.host
headers["x-forwarded-proto"] = request.scheme
url = f"{PASKIA_BACKEND_URL}/auth/api/validate?perm={perm}"
if not renew:
url += "&renew=0"
try:
response = await client.post(